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Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000600070003-1  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Harold R. Aaron  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army

SUBJECT : Scheduling of Military National Intelligence  
Estimates

REFERENCE : Memo from Gen. Aaron to DDCI dated 24 Feb 77,  
Subject: Scheduling of National Level Intel-  
ligence Estimates and Memorandums

1. I agree that certain National Intelligence Estimates could be of more use to policymakers if these estimates were published at different times of the year. My Acting Deputy for National Intelligence has previously committed himself at a meeting of the National Foreign Intelligence Board to reexamine the scheduling and structure of national estimates for the purposes you have cited, among others.

2. The National Intelligence Steering Group, chaired by the D/DCI/NI, held a meeting on 14 March devoted in part to this subject of the estimates' structure and scheduling. General Faurer of DIA made a commitment to supply the Steering Group with a list of dates on which DoD policymakers and planners would most like to have certain estimates. We understand the list is under preparation and will be furnished soon. It will then be considered by the Steering Group in light of the considerations listed below.

a. It is almost certainly too late in the year to alter substantially the scheduling of the military estimates we intend to publish in 1977.

b. I should hear the views of those in key positions in the new administration before I make any decisions on the content or scheduling of estimates.

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c. The resources of the Community are not adequate to publish in any single year the full list of estimates you recommend, particularly on such a compressed schedule. I believe, however, that the Steering Group can work up a package that will go a long way toward meeting your needs.

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

D/DCI/NI:RLehman:lm (30 Mar 77)


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25X1


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*you see what I'm trying to  
protect you from.*








1. What follows are the remarks on the NIOs for CF, SP, and USSR on Gen. Aaron's proposal to prepare all military estimates annually with publication in October.

2. All the NIOs agree that the system simply won't support such a proposal; neither the resources, the NIOs, nor the NFIB principals can focus on that much material all at the same time. As  put, an NIO can really only handle one major estimate at a time. Or, adoption of such a proposal would amount to a decision to vastly increase the analytical base and the NI staff.

3. Ideally, these estimates would, instead, be produced when new information or analysis supported doing so, or when the NSC said they wanted them.  notes that armies and navies do not change as fast as strategic threats, which means his estimates have a longer life.

4. Given that you will wish to have something positive to say,  suggested that 11-3/8 and 14 could alternate each year with one given full treatment and the other handled as a memo to holders.  wonders if all the estimates could be reviewed and up-dated by page.

5.  says he would have to start right now to produce the estimates Aaron wants by October, but he is fully occupied by his warning estimate.  says he could get 11-3/8 out by October, but only on the condition that Soviet strategy and objectives were fought out in another arena, such as a parallel 11-4, and that chapter II were pared down to treat only major problem areas.  says 11-4 is not needed for specific planning, so there ~~is~~ is nothing magic about Aaron's October date.  says departmental resources should be called on more for budget and ~~for~~ Congressional briefings.  notes that the Services

currently do quite well in preparing their statements by working from the drafts of 11-3/8.

6. In sum:

25X1 11-4 - [ ] has a work program underway. It is premature to decide when enough new material will emerge to *justify* ~~all~~ the drafting of another estimate.

11-3/8- okay for October, but only under the conditions cited above.

11-14 - The existing estimate is still valid.

25X1 11-15 - [ ] anticipates pressures to produce one soon and would be willing to <sup>examine</sup> ~~undertake~~ <sup>it</sup> the task as soon as his warning estimate is in hand. This is a suggestion not mentioned in Aaron's letter.

13 - was written in a way that it will not require re-doing for five years. Doesn't have much impact anyway.

35/36-1 - Underway, with Volume II to be completed by end of June.



## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Scheduling of Military National Intelligence Estimates

FROM:

D/DCI/NI

EXTENSION

NO.

7E62 Hqs

DATE

30 March 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DCI

4/5/77

RL

FOR ACTION: Attached is a reply to Hal Aaron's request for better scheduling of the military NIEs. We think he has a point but that he is asking too much. Our informal discussion with Sam Wilson's people indicate that they recognize this and will expect an answer of the sort we propose for you.

6.

AD/DCI/NI

RL

Richard Lehman  
AD/DCI/NI

File, pls.

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